Anasayfa | Forum Anasayfa | Profil | Kayżt | Aktif Konular | Arama
Kullanżcż ›smi
řifremi bu bilgisayarda hatżrla! 

řifrenizi Unuttunuz mu?

 BŁtŁn Forumlar
 Kore turk Tugayi
 Yeni Konu  Konuyu Yanżtla
 Printer «żkżĢż Al
Yazan ÷nceki Konu Konu Sonraki Konu  

GŲnderilme Tarihi - 26/11/2003 :  10:06:31  Profili GŲster  Alıntıyla Brilikte Cevapla
sevgili uyler sizlerden daha once sayin moderatore gonderdigim bu yaziyi size gecmeden yapamadim, sitenize arama motoruna Kore yazarak rastladim, amacim 50 yilini kutlayan Kore savasinin ABD gorkemle kutlandigi ve bu konuda hazirlanan ( Pentagon destekli ) bir sayfada tum savas katilimcisi muttefik ulkelerin yaninda TURKIYENIN ve bayraginin olmadigini cunku bizden tek bir muhatap kurumun bulunmadigi/ olmadigi cihetinde aldigim haber uzerine sitemimi belirtmek / paylasmak icindi!

Kore sehidi pilotumuzun anisina acilan sayfada bahsedilen Kore Tugayi hakkinda ve bu konuda genis kapsamli bilgimiz hicbirimizin yok!

Bu acidan Ingilizce olan yaziyi sizlerle paylasmak bu konudaki hakli gurur ve kahraman ASLANLARIMIZIN gercek hikayeseni sizlerle paylasmak istiyorum.

esen kalin

The Turkish Brigade

The Korean War, described by many, including then President Harry S. Truman, as a police action, marked the first time that the United States and the fledgling United Nations organization entered into a partnership to halt the advance of the Cold War into the Far East.
A total of 22 nations agreed to send either troops or medical units. Sixteen countries responded to the U.N. resolution by sending troops to halt the invasion of South Korea by the North Koreans. One of the first of the major participants to send a brigade was Turkey. The first Turkish contingent arrived on October 19, 1950, and in varying strengths remained until midsummer 1954.
Initially, Turkey sent the 1st Turkish Brigade, commanded by Brig. Gen. Tahsin Yazici. The brigade consisted of three battalions commanded by Major Imadettin Kuranel, Major Mithat Ulunu, and Major Lutfu Bilgon. The Turkish Armed Forces Command (TAFC) was a regimental combat team with three infantry battalions, along with supporting artillery and engineers. It was the only brigade-sized UN unit attached permanently to a U.S. division throughout the Korean War.
More than 5,000 men of the 1st Turkish Brigade, including liaison and the advance party, arrived in Pusan, South Korea, on October 17 from the eastern Mediterranean port of Iskenderun, Turkey. The brigade unloaded from their ship and proceeded to the newly opened U.N. reception center located just outside of Taegu. The bulk of the enlisted men were from small towns and villages in the mountains of eastern Turkey. For these volunteer officers and volunteer enlisted men who were just completing their compulsory two year service, it was not only the first time that they had left their native country--it was the first time they had been out of the villages of their birth. It was, at least for the enlisted men, the first time that they had encountered non-Muslims. Vast cultural and religious differences existed between the Turks and the Americans.
Their commander, General Yazici, was an aging brigadier who had been a division commander fighting the British at Gallipoli in 1916. He was highly regarded in the Turkish military establishment and willingly stepped down a rank in order to command the first contingent of Turks in Korea. He had only one drawback--no real command of English--yet he was attached to an American division. Later, that lack of language proficiency would prove to be a major hindrance to his understanding of orders and troop deployments.
The U.S. Army command was unaware of the difficulties in coordination, logistics and, above all, basic communication in a common language that would complicate orders and troop movements, especially in the crucial early months of their joint exercises. Unfamiliar food, clothing requirements and transportation would come to create more problems than the American high command had counted on. The dietary requirements of the Turks forbade pork products, and the American rations definitely contained pork products forbidden to all Muslims. A Japanese food processor was hired to provide rations that met the Turkish requirements. Bread and coffee presented other problems. The Turks favored a heavy, substantial bread containing nonbleached flour along with thick, strong, heavily sweetened coffee. The U.S. Army found a way to satisfy these needs along with those of the other Allied forces.
Few American liaison officers were attached to the Turkish companies, thereby adding to the problems the Turks faced in their initial combat operations. Misinterpretation of orders resulted from the lack of communication between Allies. The problem, at first overlooked and judged to be only minor, only became exacerbated in the heat of battle.
The Turks' arrival in Korea garnered a considerable amount of publicity. The Turkish soldiers' fierce appearance, flowing mustaches and great knives were a war correspondent's dream come true. Although they had not fought in a major conflict since World War I, the Turkish soldiers had the reputation of being rough, hard fighters who preferred the offensive position and gave no quarter in battle. Most of the enlisted men were young and carried a sidearm sword that, to Americans and the other U.N. troops, appeared to be a long knife. No other U.N. troops were armed with that kind of knife, or indeed any other weapon out of the ordinary. The Turks had a dangerous proficiency in close combat with their long knives that made all other Allied forces want to stay clear of them.

Turkish Brigade's Baptism of Fire Part 2: Flawed Offensives

Most of the enlisted men were from the eastern steppe region of Turkey near the Russian border and had little more than three or four years of basic schooling. In the conscription process, they were given uniforms, plus some training by the Turkish military and their U.S. military advisers. Life in their native villages had been largely unchanged for hundreds of years. A central village well still provided water, and news of the outside world seldom penetrated village daily life.

It was to that patchwork U.N. army, composed mainly of Americans but having diverse units from 16 other countries, that the orders suddenly came to General Walton "Johnnie" Walker's Eighth Army headquarters to mount a massive offensive and push for an early end to the war. General Douglas MacArthur's promise to relieve two divisions and have "the boys home for Christmas" gave the impetus to an ill-conceived move to the Yalu River. There were some expressed misgivings, especially by the Eighth Army commander, General Walker. Those objections, however, were quickly pushed aside by the clique that surrounded MacArthur. Pressure to conclude the war in one massive offensive became too difficult to contain. The generals and commanders in the field who would actually commit their men to one of the bloodiest campaigns of the war were protesting voices that were either never acknowledged or ignored.

Intelligence reports given to MacArthur indicated the presence and capture of Chinese troops in late October and early November. Major General Willoughby, MacArthur's intelligence chief, kept him abreast of all incoming reports of larger numbers of Chinese troop movements. Nonetheless, the die was cast for Walker's Eighth Army. Walker tried several times to delay the inevitable by protesting the lack of logistical support and supplies that were en route from Japan and the United States, but all he accomplished was to increase MacArthur's ire toward him and impatience at the delay.

Bitter winds from Manchuria churned over the steep, granitic mountains and treacherous valleys of North Korea. The coldest weather in at least 40 years gripped the land. Numbed and miserable soldiers tried to keep warm around makeshift fires made in empty 50-gallon drums. Medical units began treating their first cases of frostbite. More and more, Korea became the proverbial "Hell froze over." It was necessary to mix alcohol with the gasoline to prevent gas lines from freezing in the vehicles and equipment. Blood plasma had to be heated for 90 minutes before it could be used. Medicines that were water-soluble froze, and sweat that accumulated in the soldiers' boots froze during the night. The terrain of northern Korea, with its long v-shaped valleys, high craggy mountain ridges and the lack of any real discernible roads, along with the incredible numbing cold sweeping across the forward-moving army, contributed the elements of tragedy that shaped the battle to come.

The U.S. Army's 7th Division and other units were not prepared for arctic warfare. Few of the fighting units had arctic parkas. Yet they were ordered forward. On November 21, they were ordered to move across a riverbed containing what they had been told would be only ankle-deep water that would present no problem. The night before, however, upstream dams had been opened and the water released. The soldiers waded into frigid, waist-deep water with chunks of ice floating in it. After several unsuccessful attempts, the crossing was called off. Eighteen men suffered severe frostbite and had to have their frozen uniforms cut off.

During the dogged advance, Walker's army became more thinly stretched as the Korean Peninsula widened and forced the army to cover more territory as it moved steadily northward. His order of battle was comprised of the U.S. I Corps, consisting of the U.S. 24th Division, the British 27th Brigade, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) 1st Division; the U.S. IX Corps including the U.S. 2nd and 25th Divisions and the 1st Turkish Brigade; the ROK 6th, 7th, and 8th divisions; and the 1st Cavalry Division in Army reserve.

Walker was cautious about committing his troops. Intelligence tried to get some realistic estimates about the Chinese troop strength and their movements. Daily briefings in early November indicated a dramatic increase in Chinese and North Korean troop strength from 40,100 to 98,400 men. These estimates still were woefully inadequate.

Part 3: Under Pressure

Assembled in front of Walker's IX Corps in the west was the XIII Army Group of the Chinese Fourth Field Army, consisting of 18 infantry divisions totaling at least 180,000 men. Opposing the U.S. I Corps in the east was the IX Army Group of the Chinese Third Field Army with 12 infantry divisions of about 120,000 men. The total Chinese strength was about 300,000 men; 12 divisions of the North Korean Peoples Army added approximately 65,000 men to the enemy strength. The North Korean soldiers had recovered sufficiently from their earlier reverses at the hands of the Americans to be judged by their commanders to be battle worthy. Added to that array were about 40,000 guerrillas operating behind the U.N. lines. Enemy strength was more than slightly underestimated.

The Chinese army had managed to move a vast number of troops by the most primitive means. Using animals and their own backs to transport supplies, they were not restricted to the primitive roads. They moved overland without the benefit of trucks or other mechanized equipment and therefore had the advantage of greater mobility. The United Nations, on the other hand, stuck with basic roads and improving existing roads to move men and equipment. Engineering companies moved ahead, trying to make roads passable for tanks and trucks.

Another difference that was to count very highly against the United Nations and the United States was adherence to routine, World War II thinking and tactics. Chinese used soldiers were expected to carry on their backs all the food each soldier required for at least six days. The food was cooked rice and soybean curds in concentrated form as well as similar items that required no cooking or heating in order to be eaten. Recovered diaries of the Chinese soldiers recount their pangs of hunger from these severely restricted rations, but they achieved their objective in the same bitter cold and biting winds and over the same terrain that handicapped their U.N. opponents.

The Chinese generally marched at night and averaged at least 18 miles per day for approximately 18 days. In the daylight hours, they concealed themselves in the rough, mountainous terrain. The only daylight movement allowed was by scouting parties. Restrictions were so onerous that officers were authorized to shoot to kill any soldier who violated the order for concealment. Many of the Chinese movement tactics were similar to those used by Napoleon Bonaparte a century and a half earlier.

On November 19, the U.S. 25th Division left Kaesong at 6 a.m. and bedded down at the mining town of Kunu-ri around 2 o'clock that night. The next day, the Turkish Brigade, which was largely an infantry unit without trucks for troop transport, was detached and reassigned to the IX Corps reserve at Kunu-ri. Walker's Eighth Army command was split down the middle by the Chongchon River.

As part of the IX Corps' general northward advance, the Turks were ordered on November 21 to move north with the 25th Division. By November 22, 1950, the Turks had completed their assignment of neutralizing North Korean patrols in their assigned area. The steady movement to Kunu-ri had begun in earnest. Kunu-ri, much like all the other small villages in the northern sector, was mainly mud-and-stick houses. It was a totally unremarkable place, little different from any of the other villages perched on the mountainsides and in the deep valleys cut by swift-moving mountain rivers and streams.

Advancing along with their American counterparts, the Turks were ordered to establish contact with the U.S. 2nd Division on the right flank of the IX Corps and also to cover the right flank and rear of their division. The brigade had received information concerning a Chinese regiment known to be northwest of Tokchon. General Yazici described the situation that confronted him in these words:

"This was what the order was. Further intelligence was asked about the enemy and the ROK Corps, but none was available or more information was not supplied lest it lower the morale of the Turkish Brigade....The situation was serious, and demanded prompt action."

On November 26, the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) launched strong counterattacks against the U.S. I Corps and IX Corps. The main Chinese force moved down the central mountain ranges against the ROK II Corps at Tokchon. The South Koreans could not withstand the attack and their defenses collapsed.

Part 4: Mixed Fortunes

The Chinese onslaught assumed alarming proportions, and the Turks were ordered to protect the U.N. right flank. Trucks were assigned to transport the Turks' 1st Battalion to Wawon, 15 miles east of Kunu-ri, about halfway to Takchon, unload and return for the 2nd Battalion. After insufficient trucks arrived, some of the brigade set out on foot. Orders, counterorders and garbled transmissions made the situation an unintelligible mess. The Turks were ordered to close the road and secure Unsong-ni. Trying later to explain the confusion of that time, General Yazici wrote:

"There was no time to move the brigade to Unsong-ni and deploy it there before dark. Besides, the enemy, which was supposed to be at Chongsong-ni, was in fact too close to the line which the Corps wanted us to hold. That the Brigade might be subjected to a surprise attack before reaching its position was highly probable. Even more important was the fact that the civilian population had not been moved out of the area. If the peasants and the guerrillas that might have been infiltrated among them attempted to block the mountain crossing or the Wawon Pass in the rear, the Brigade might suffer heavily. As a matter of fact, the 2nd Division, of which we were supposed to defend the right flank, was withdrawing. It was impossible to fulfill the task from Karil L'yong, where the Brigade was, because the terrain was very rugged and thickly wooded. In order to protect the Kunu-riTokchon road and the other roads to the north and the south, a 12-mile-wide front had to be held. This was impossible against a numerically superior enemy who knew the region well. Further, the terrain restricted the effective use of artillery and heavy infantry weapons."

As Yazici clearly outlined, the Turks were in an unenviable situation. They had to withdraw to the southeast. That withdrawal compounded the exposure of the Turks' own east flank as well as the 2nd Division's east flank. Yazici ordered his men to move in the direction of Wawon northeast of Kunu-ri. The brigade had lost contact with corps. Therefore, Yazici assumed responsibility and ordered his men to position themselves at Wawon. When they reached Wawon, they attacked toward Tokchon, on foot and without tank support. The terrain was upstream along the Tongjukkyo River into the mountain divide that separated the Chongchon River from the Taedong drainage. Here, the headwaters of the Tongjukkyo River fan out into numerous small streams.

When he received intelligence that air observers had seen hundreds of Chinese moving toward Tokchon, Maj. Gen. Laurence Kaiser, commanding the U.S. 2nd Division, remarked, "That's where they are going to hit." The Chinese counteroffensive actually struck all along the front. Two platoons of the Turkish Brigade assigned reconnaissance duty were now given rear-guard duty. The Chinese followed the brigade closely. The reconnaissance unit engaged the oncoming Chinese at the Karil L'yong Pass, was unable to break contact. Only a few men survived.

The Turks had achieved one objective--they had tied down the enemy. The Chinese suffered heavy casualties trying repeatedly to take the Turkish position, and all their attacks were repelled. Finally, Yazici, understanding that the brigade was being encircled by the numerically superior Chinese, ordered withdrawal.

The Turks were isolated in the subzero temperatures, their orders not fully understood. And during the night, the Chinese kept up a steady barrage of sudden noises using drums, bugles, whistles, flutes, shepherds' pipes and cymbals, along with the shouting, laughing and chattering of human voices.

The offensive had changed and now became a rout of the U.N. forces. The engulfing enemy constantly changed tactics and directions.. Communications resumed with the Turkish Brigade. Some orders were understood, but most were not. The brigade was ordered to merge with the U.S. 38th Regiment, cover the 38th's flank and secure a retreat route westward. In the confusion of the retreat and the garbled, misdirected and delayed messages, that crucial directive was two hours late in delivery. The column got turned about in the mass confusion and congestion of the road.

Once again, as the Turks approached Wawon, they encountered heavy enemy fire. The CCF had arrived before the Turks were able to reassemble and assume defensive positions. The Chinese ripped into the ragged column and the soldiers were ordered to turn about once again. The Turkish 9th Company took the brunt of the attack as it covered for the retreating main body. The 10th Company of the brigade's 3rd Battalion received orders to form the brigade's general outpost line.

Major Lutfu Bilgin, commander of the 3rd Battalion, sent his 9th Company to defend the 10th and 11th companies' flank. The Chinese eased off on the 10th but continued to besiege the 9th and the 11th. Midmorning on November 28, the Chinese broke through and attacked the 9th's position in force. The company was overrun, and Major Bilgin and many of his men were killed.

Enemy reinforcements tried to encircle the entire brigade. General Yazici, however, assessed the situation and took steps to protect his flank and avoid encirclement. The CCF poured forward, and the Turks were caught in the trap that the Chinese were laying. Suddenly, the Chinese broke off after encountering strong resistance of the 3rd Battalion.

During the withdrawal, the Chinese had attacked the Turks with overwhelming force and the brigade took such high casualties that by November 30 it was destroyed as a battleworthy unit. The only support the Turks received from IX Corps was a tank platoon and truck transportation. That was added to the brigade's artillery and enabled some of the brigade to survive.

Part 5: Aftermath

The flow of messages and changed orders to the Turks on the road to Tokchon on November 27 reflected the lack of precise information and the high level of uncertainty that IX Corps and the Eighth Army experienced as they struggled to interpret the rapidly enfolding events. One certainty was that, during the day, the Chinese attacked the leading 1st Battalion at Wawon and this ambush inflicted the devastating blow to the Turks. The battalion was surrounded, and a hand-to-hand battle between Chinese bayonets and Turkish long knives took place. It was reported that the two companies of Turks were still fighting east of Wawaon and had about 400 men wounded. General Yazici was at his headquarters in Taechon, a larger village southeast of Kunu-ri. The Turks held out at Wawon until the afternoon and then withdrew to another position southwest of Wawon. Again, the Chinese outflanked those Turks, who then withdrew toward Kunu-ri. The Turkish battalion lost most of its vehicles. The survivors scrambled into the hills when all other means of escape was denied them. By that time, the Chinese held all the roads. The Turks continued to fight delaying actions to gain time for the rest of their troops to re-form and establish some semblance of an orderly defense, but they were not successful in any of those efforts.

At the 2nd Division Headquarters, information about the Turks and their actual movements was more and more difficult to obtain. The tanks sent toward the Turks' position were repeatedly turned back. Confusion led to startling events, such as American soldiers simply abandoning their positions and equipment, including their weapons. The Chinese appeared to be everywhere and nowhere at the same time. Confirmation of Chinese movements was sparse and often erroneous. The Chinese, reported to be just ahead, turned out to be advancing on the soldiers from behind. The Turks decided to evacuate the command post. A new and yet ancient style of warfare had begun.

The Chinese and North Koreans used a multiple of tactics in a mountainous terrain that left little, if any, mobility. The weather had become an enemy as cruel as the terrain. The Turks and Americans, unable to communicate and coordinate, fought valiantly, but without much direction and without knowing what their fellow soldiers and units were doing.

The U.N. response to the Chinese offensive in November 1950 has been described as a "bugout," a massive retreat that should not have happened. Very little has been written about the conditions that contributed to the failure of MacArthur's November offensive, an offensive that began with high expectations of bringing the soldiers home for Christmas. Afterward, the words "home for Christmas" rang hollow in the ears of both the military and the politicians. The terrain, the weather, the lack of adequate language skills by the Americans and the Turks, and the lack of options for that massive an operation preordained the bloody, tragic outcome.

In the course of the U.N. offensive and the Chinese counteroffensive, the 1st Turkish Brigade suffered 3,514 casualties, of which 741 were killed in action, 2,068 wounded, 163 missing and 244 taken prisoner, as well as 298 noncombatant casualties.

The Turks, armed and trained by American military advisers, did better than even they had hoped or expected in this, their first real combat since World War I. The American units to which they were attached respected their skills and tenacity in combat. Some comments by American officers give insight into the Turks and their abilities. "They really prefer to be on the offensive and handle it quite well," went one appraisal. "They are not as good at defensive positions, and certainly never retreat." Another report told of their patrol skills: "Certain Turkish patrols always reported high body counts when they returned from patrols. Headquarters always scoffed at the high numbers, much higher in fact than any other unit, until the Turks decided to bring the enemy bodies back and dump them at headquarters for the body count."

The Turks acquitted themselves in a brave and noble fashion in some of the worst conditions experienced in the Korean War. Very little else could have been required or expected of them. Their heavy casualties speak of their honor and commitment. Their bravery requires no embellishment. It stands on its own.

This article was written by A.K. Dawson and originally published in Military History Magazine December 1997. A.K. Dawson teaches history in Darwin, Australia.



5 Cevap
GŲnderilme Tarihi - 29/11/2003 :  04:48:11  Profili GŲster  Ziyaret Kilic'ın Anasayfasını  Alıntıyla Brilikte Cevapla
Sevgili Kasatura,
Makaleyi simdi okudum, sehit pilotumuzla ilgili kulaktanda olsa biraz bilgim vardi tabiki bunu pekistirdi. Sitemini cok iyi anliyor ve paylasiyorum. Fakat bence bunu ayri bi topic yaparak Genel Konulara tasimalisin. Ben onume gelen butun Turk gazetelerine e-mail attim bunu aliskanlik halina getirdim. Bir sekilde Televole ve benzeri programlarla tepkisizlestirilmis insanlarimiza seslerini duyurmayi anlatmaliyiz. Ben bir web sitesi daha acacagim degisik bir platform yaratmak istiyorum. Gorusmek uzere.

" A little rain must fall in everyones life"Sayfa Başına Git


17 Cevap
GŲnderilme Tarihi - 02/12/2003 :  09:47:53  Profili GŲster  Alıntıyla Brilikte Cevapla
Can kandasim,Kilic Beg

O kadar cok yere tasidimki, Genelkurmay dahil bazi Askeri Kurumlara kadar yazdim sanirim onlar bir muhatap bulacaklardir, gostermis oldugun ilgi ve hassasiyet icin sukranlarimi sunarken , bu sitede cogunluk olduklarini dusundugum genc ucucu Subay adaylarinin ve Sivil akademikerlerin konuya ozellikle egileceklerini candan diliyorum.

Ama oylesine bir vurdumduymazlik ve tekduzelik icimize sinmiski, Harbiyedeki Askeri muzenin ilk acildigi yillarda , sanirim 90 li senelerin basiydi , Turk okculugundan ve oklarindan bahsedilen bolum ve aciklama panosunda ( ING) Middle Asia yerine Middle East ten gelen Turkler yazisini panadon sildirmek icin sayin mudur Albaya dokmedigim dil kalmamisti!! hatirlamaya calisin lutfen , hani TRT dizisi olan Kurtulusta malzeme ve konu zenginliginin yani sira !! Birinci dunya savasinda daha dogmamis olan Amerikan Ikinci cihan harbi enventari olan 30 cal. M1 Karabin tufekleri ( Hava kuvvetleri Envanterinde sanirim hala varlar) Kurtulus Savasi Suvarilerinin omuzlarinda Afyon ovasinda boy gostermisti Ikinci Dunya Harbi silahlari ,, Birinci Dunya Harbi evresi sahnelerinde gaflet ...el alame kamyon dolusu hurda fiyatina Silah satarken bir film cekimlik 20 - 30 adet mavzer karabin birakmadilar depolarinda ulkenin!!

Ayni sekilde Genelkurmay baskanligi tarihi kitasi her 30 Agustosta 4 degisik manga ile resmi gecit yapar..dikkat buyurun Canakkale yada Birinci Dunya harbi mufrezesinde Ingiliz Lee Enfield Mark 1 tufekleri goreceksiniz??

Turk Ordusu Birinci Cihan da ne zaman Ingiliz Tufengi kullandi?? ..belki Kurtulus savasinda ve Cumhuriyetin ilk yillarinda ve daha sonra Ikinci Harb icin birliklerimize, daha once ele gecirenler ve yapilan alimlar ile elde edilenler verildi amma!!!! ..Hele Hele Canakkalede !! olurmu hic?? seref tiribununde oturan kullu kuffar askeri gozlemci gulmezmi buna ..laf olsun torba o oyle okul musameresi gibi yakisirmi hic bize..degisiklik olsun seneye Japon Tufekleride gorursek sasmayalim..

Hele hele nadide ve emsalsiz boyali basinimizin Askerlik yapmamis Savas ve Askeri muhabirleri abuk sabuk yorumlar ile kirilan F16 dan F4 Savasan Sahin yada kirilan F 4 den F16 Phantom diye bahsedip dururlarken......

Nereden nereye buyurun amma!!!ucak yapmaya giden yol A dan Z ye kadar once ama en once !! VISYON - BILGI ve onemle DETAY sahibi olmakla baslar dememmi gerekiyor...

saygiyla , sevgiyle

ChavuschSayfa Başına Git


1 Cevap
GŲnderilme Tarihi - 25/03/2014 :  14:42:05  Profili GŲster  Ziyaret WillieTIX'ın Anasayfasını   WillieTIX a bir ICQ mesajı GŲnder  Alıntıyla Brilikte Cevapla
des extraits yep, t'en as plein YT et DM, plus sur quelques et fora de bandes parigoes. [URL=]Nike Pas Cher[/URL] Moi, je l'ai faite t√™ter non sans me poser de questions. Mais, entre le calme m√™me au bout d'une heure de t√™t√©e ou des cris pendant 2 voire 3 heures,n√ītre choix √©tait vite fait. Aujourd'hui, elle a 10 mois et ell sendor seule √† la sieste comme le soir. Mais, elle ne nous a fait la vie que vers 7 8 mois √† la suite du d√©menagement. [URL=]Nike Pas Cher[/URL] Au niveau confort, on m'avait dit que les bastidons √©taient v√©tustes, je n'ai pas trouv√©. Nous on a bien aim√© cette formule, avec des enfants c'est bien : plus spacieux qu'un mobilhome et moins bruyant. Pour la chaleur je dirai que c'est un peu moins chaud mais on a quand m√™me eu tr√®s tr√®s chaud la nuit. Rassurez vous le g√©rant m'a dit quand on est parti (je lui avais fait la r√©flexion sur la chaleur) qu'ils allaient climatiser les bastidons cet hiver.Je pr√©f√®re les emplacements des bastidons que les mobilhomes, bizarrement m√™me s'ils sont coll√©s, on voit moins les voisins que dans les mobilhomes. Ils sont vraiment les uns sur les autres et il y a bcp de vis √† vis.Enfin apr√®s tout cela d√©pend de ce que l'on recherche : la tranquilit√© (plut√īt les bastidons) ou la rencontre avec ses voisins (plut√īt mobilhome).En effet, avec 4 enfants, il vaut mieux prendre un bastidon, c'est plus sapcieux. Et surtout ce qui est appr√©ciable, et que l'on n'a pas toujours en emplacement mobilhome, c'est la terrasse ombrag√©e.Vous prendrez un bastidon simple ou √† un √©tage ? nous on avait un simple donc je ne peux pas vous en dire plus pour les autres, √† part que j'ai vu qu'ils √©taient plus pr√®s de la piscine et que les haies qui d√©limitaient les terrasses √©taient plus denses. Mais bon c'est quand m√™me pas donn√©, alors si on met plus cher dans le bastidon , on a moins √† d√©penser pendant les vacances !!Personnellement dans ce type de camping immense, j'ai opt√© pour le mobilhome uniquement parce que j'ai cherch√© sur sites de location internet une annonce de propri√©taires qui louaient dans ce camping car beaucoup moins cher (700√†800/semaine en pleine saison), bien mieux √©quip√© (en √©lectrom√©nager par exemple) et selon photos vous voyez aussit√īt si l'emplacement est tr√®s ombrag√© ou non, avec terrasse bois ou pas. Par contre, par le camping ou les soci√©t√©s annexes qui y sont pr√©sentes, pas possible de choisir et c'est tr√®s risqu√©. Bien que le camping soit super ombrag√©, il suffit que vous tombiez sur l'un des seuls emplacements ou les arbres sont d√©charn√©s et l√† c'est la r√ītissoire assur√©e. J'y suis all√©e 3 semaines en juillet 2008 et 2009. Je vais ailleurs cette ann√©e, toujours en 4√©toiles, en location d'un propri√©taire, mais je retournerai une autre fois √† la Palmeraie. Ce qui est tr√®s d√©cevant dans ce camping ce sont les animations en soir√©e vraiment TROP NULLES (cette ann√©e j'esp√©rais que ce serait mieux, et bien non puisqu'il para√ģt que cela fait des ann√©es que c'est ainsi) et 2 ann√©es de suite √ßa lasse.Les batisdons, j'ai pu les voir, mais cette formule de maisonnettes scotch√©es les unes aux autres, expos√©es en plein soleil, ce n'est pas ce que je recherche. Pour moi, vivre ses vacances au camping ce n'est pas dans une maison. Il faut regarder sur le plan fourni par le camping : evitez ceux de la rang√©e 59 √† 78. Prendre plut√īt dans la rang√©e de 1 √† 24. Ce n'est pas loin de la piscine. Nous, l'an pass√©, nous √©tions dans un bastidon sans √©tage au n162. Regardez sur le plan, c'est tout au fond !! On √©tait au calme √ßa c'est vrai ! tr√®s agr√©able avec des enfants. Et on ne s'est pas senti loin de la piscine. Par contre c'est vrai que pour aller √† l'accueil ou √† la piscine de la baume . On passait √† l'accueil quand on partait en voiture se promener. Ca c'est un inconv√©nient mais le camping est tr√®s bien, √ßa compense.Les blocs sanitaires de ce camping sont tr√®s bien entretenus par le personnel du camping qui passe r√©guli√®rement pour le nettoyage. D'ailleurs, logeant pourtant en mobilhome en face d'un de ces sanitaires, nous y allons r√©guli√®rement prendre nos douches car spacieuses et temp√©rature fra√ģche assur√©e vu la chaleur ext√©rieure !. Vraiment rien √† redire sur l'entretien, sans parler de l'architecture superbe de ces espaces bien dans le style Palmeraie.Bonnes vacances assur√©es dans ce superbe camping tr√®s agr√©able !.Points positifs : Les piscines bien s√Ľr mais il y a beaucoup de monde en pleine saison et les ma√ģtres nageurs sont trop s√©v√®res √† mon go√Ľt. Je n'ai pas test√© les animations mais √ßa avait l'air sympa.Points n√©gatifs : loin de la ville et de la plage, on est oblig√© de prendre la voiture. Camping beaucoup trop grand, je l'ai trouv√© un peu trop bruyant le soir ( mais il y a des gens qui aiment ). L'all√©e centrale o√Ļ passent les voitures doit √™tre invivable pour ceux qui sont en tente. L'accueil est plut√īt moyen, c'est un peu une usine √† pognon.A part √ßa j'ai pass√© de bonnes vacances. J'allais le matin √† la piscine ou √† la plage ( beaucoup moins de monde ) et je profitais de mon apr√®s midi pour me reposer et visiter cette r√©gion magnifique !Je pense effectivement que ce doit √™tre un peu "usine", mais mes enfants ont eu le coup de coeur. Nous √©tions dans le m√™me secteur l'ann√©e derni√®re et le camping √©tait d√©cevant car petite piscine et un seul toboggan qui n'a pas march√© la 1er semaine o√Ļ nous y √©tions le camping dont je parle est "les pins parasols" (je d√©conseille).Par contre pas de bruit le soir car aucune animation.Mais j'avoue que c'est super pour passer de bonnes nuits !!!Je vais mettre dans la valise des boulles quies si j'ai bien compris.Le contact que j'ai eu au t√©l√©phone pour la r√©servation a √©t√© tout √† fait correct. reste √† voir l'acceuil √† notre arriv√©e.Pour la piscine est ce qu'il est accept√© les boxer de bain ? Ou il faut absolument le "slip" de bain ?En tout cas c'est sympa de votre part de m'apporter des r√©ponses. Merci beaucoupPour vos enfants, n'ayez aucune crainte ils appr√©cieront !C'est vrai que ce camping c'est un peu l'usine vu sa taille, et donc rien √† voir avec les petites structures o√Ļ tout le monde fini par se conna√ģtre.Mais les avantages font vite oublier les petits inconv√©nients. C'est vrai qu'√† la piscine, les surveillants sont assez stricts surtout sur les gradins et toboggans, mais si c'√©tait l'inverse le camping serait aussi critiqu√©. Il faut dire qu'avec le monde qu'il y a, surtout l'apr√®s midi, il faut un peu de "discipline" sinon on risque les accidents et les parents seraient peut √™tre les premiers √† trouver que la piscine manque de surveillance. Par contre, pour les maillots, ils sont cool, j'ai vu de tout : des slips, boxers, et m√™me souvent des bermudas de bain.Selon l'√Ęge de vos enfants, les animations sont pas mal (divers tournois sportifs dans la journ√©e, les "olympiades" toujours tr√®s attractives), mais pas √† la hauteur du camping surtout en soir√©e, c'est mon simple avis mais d'apr√®s le forum je crois qu'il est partag√©. Il faut dire que les animateurs, tr√®s sympas, font ce qu'ils peuvent avec les "moyens du bord", sachant qu'ils font √ßa apr√®s leurs diverses activit√©s du jour. Vous aurez droit √† la danse du camping, toujours un moment sympa (plus ou moins suivi par l'assistance) pour cl√īturer les soir√©es cabarets. Si vos enfants sont des ados, en soir√©e il y a toujours la discoth√®que gratuite. Par contre, attention, j'esp√®re que le camping accentuera sa surveillance sur ce point, car beaucoup de jeunes (√©trangers surtout) ne font pas que boire des jus de fruits et fumer du tabac, sans en dire plus, car ils ne consomment pas au bar mais viennent avec leurs propres bouteilles de coca "am√©lior√©". Mes filles ont 16 et 19 ans et ont pu me raconter certaines soir√©es. Les pompiers ont d√Ľ venir un soir de juillet dernier pour une jeune hollandaise de 15 ans dans un coma √©thilique !.ÔĽŅCamping pas cher dans le sud de la france pr√®s de l'espagne [URL=]Nike Pas Cher[/URL] Ce matin, Chlo√© m'a dit qu'hier soir je n'avais rien rat√© : elle s'est ennuy√©e comme un rat mort. Par contre j'ai oubli√© de pr√©ciser un petit d√©tail, hier soir chez les proprios . je trouve que le p√®re me porte (beaucoup) trop d'affection, les raisons je ne les sais pas mais il me prend tout le temps dans ses bras, il me dit constamment que je suis belle, enfin c'est un peu, voire tr√®s, g√™nant. Je suis "l√©g√®rement" mal √† l'aise du coup. [URL=]Nike Blazer[/URL] Partie 1 S'organiser Les cuisines collectivesa change pas le monde, mais. √ßa aide. [URL=]Chaussure Nike[/URL] Une g Y en demande de reconnaissance La forte demande de reconnaissance exprim par la g Y est parfois jug par l professionnel comme pr et exacerb Les jeunes de moins de 25 ans se retrouvent dans les trois types de reconnaissance classiquement reconnus : la reconnaissance affective, la reconnaissance juridique et la reconnaissance sociale. La socialisation des jeunes n il y a moins de 35 ans a donn lieu des exp communes de reconnaissance ou de d de reconnaissance dans chacune de ces trois sph [URL=]Nike Pas Cher[/URL] Deux navires de croisi√®re devront √©galement √™tre disponibles pour loger les f√™tards. [URL=][/URL] decennies (si ce n'est plus), je tombe par hasard sur cette paire. Coup de foudre visuel, elles sont tout simplement incroyables. Quelques temps plus tad, les voici √† mes pieds. Retour en [URL=]Nike Blazer[/URL] C'est une occupation tr con, mais entre et rester assis sur des escaliers ?se regarder en chiens de faillance. [URL=]Nike Blazer Femme[/URL] L√† est le drame! Et c la nourriture des politiques et des dirigeants

Sayfa Başına Git

 Yeni Konu  Konuyu Yanżtla
 Printer «żkżĢż Al

Tayyareci Forum : İKOVAN BİLİŞİM

Go To Top Of Page
Snitz Forums 2000